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PLAYING NICE IN THE SANDBOX: MAKING
ROOM FOR HISTORIC STRUCTURES IN
OLYMPIC NATIONAL PARK
Christopher Chellis*
ABSTRACT: As ambitious as it is at times challenging to meaningfully apply,
the Wilderness Act purports to secure for the American people of present and
future generations the benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness. Interest
groups often seek to extract from the Act a meaning of wilderness that comports
with whatever interest they wish to secure for themselves and their members,
and their interests often conflict with each other. These conflicts can turn
national parks into sandboxes where interest groups draw lines and ask the
National Park Service to pick a side. The losing party inevitably looks to a judge
who, in her infinite wisdom, will surely see that wilderness means exactly what
the party knows it means. Injunction in hand, the now-prevailing party’s favored
use will flourish and all will be right in the world, or at least in wilderness. A
microcosm of litigation over competing uses nationally, Olympic National Park
in Washington State has played host to its fair share of sandbox showdowns, the
presence of historic structures in the park eliciting perhaps the most wideranging response from interest groups. This Article examines arguments from
those seeking to preserve these structures and those seeking to remove them,
and suggests a reading of the Act and its Washington State counterpart that
comports with legislative intent.
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INTRODUCTION TO ISSUES ARISING FROM
COMPETING USES IN OLYMPIC NATIONAL PARK

Stuck between a rock and a hard place, the National Park
Service (NPS) does not have the easiest job in managing
wilderness areas.1 Those who depend on recreational use of the
area for business will challenge a wilderness management plan
restricting visitor access.2 Motorcyclists litigate $100 fines for
riding over twenty miles in a protected area.3 A court shoots
down an effort to introduce sockeye salmon into a lake because
the project was a prohibited “commercial enterprise.”4
Given its scenic beauty, diverse landscape, old growth rain
forests, and distinct ecosystems, it easy to understand why
Washington’s Olympic National Park5 (the Park) has inspired
a series of use-related litigation not unlike the litigation above.
A quick glance at the Park’s official website reveals pictures of
hikers, backpackers, fishermen, and lodgers, all of whom visit
the Park with different, and sometimes conflicting, uses in
mind.6 What a quick glance at the website will not reveal are
the historic shelters7 that dot the Park’s wilderness areas and
sharply divide the purists from the preservationists.
Interest groups sparring over permitted and prohibited uses
within the Park is hardly new, but litigation over historic
* 2017 JD Candidate at Willamette University College of Law. This Article was
researched and written under the supervision and guidance of Professor Jeffrey C.
Dobbins, Associate Professor of Law at Willamette University College of Law and
Executive Director of the Oregon Law Commission.
1. Distinct from the colloquial “wilderness,” the legal “wilderness area” is “an area of
undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence, without
permanent improvements or habitation.” 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (2012).
2. See Friends of Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Dombeck, 164 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir.
1999).
3. McMichael v. United States, 355 F.2d 283, 284 (9th Cir. 1965).
4. Wilderness Soc’y v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th
Cir. 2003).
5. Located just west of Seattle, in the corner of northwest Washington, Olympic
National Park spans nearly a million acres, including 70 miles of coastline. NAT’L
PARK SERV., Discover Olympic’s Diverse Wilderness, OLYMPIC NAT’L PARK
WASHINGTON, https://www.nps.gov/olym/index.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2017).
6. Id.
7. Recognized shelters appear in the National Register of Historic Places, the official
list of the Nation’s historic places worthy of preservation. The National Park Service
provides a searchable database. See NAT’L PARK SERV., National Register of Historic
Places
Program:
Research,
OLYMPIC
NAT’L
PARK
WASHINGTON,
https://www.nps.gov/nr/research/index.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2017).
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shelters in the Park’s wilderness areas came to a head in 2005
in a case pitting conservationists against the NPS. 8
Attempting to reconstruct two shelters9 largely destroyed by
snow and to preserve their place in the Park, the NPS flew the
shelters to their original location in a wilderness area by
helicopter after completely rebuilding them in a Park
maintenance yard.10 Pointing to both the Wilderness Act’s call
for earth “untrammeled by man”11 and the designation of the
Park as a wilderness area in the Washington Park Wilderness
Act (WPWA),12 a conservation group argued that the NPS had
violated both statutes and that the shelters had no place in a
wilderness area.13 Providing a different reading of the
Wilderness Act and looking to the National Historic
Preservation Act (NHPA) for support, the NPS argued that its
actions were not only permitted but encouraged by the
statutes.14 The case highlighted the differences between those
who value historic preservation in wilderness and those who
value wilderness free from any human influence, a common
theme in legal disputes arising from park use.15
A dense, ambitious, and often times ambiguous statute, the
Wilderness Act requires a close reading to parse its practical
effect on Park use. This Article therefore begins, in Part II, by
providing historical context for the enactment of the
Wilderness Act and background on the NHPA. There are a few
key phrases in each statute, the interpretation of which will
determine whose competing interest takes precedence over the
other. Identifying those phrases and noting how Congress and
interested parties interpreted their practical application to
national parks before enactment will prove helpful in
8. Olympic Park Assocs. v. Mainella, No. C04-5732FDB, 2005 WL 1871114 (W.D.
Wash. Aug. 1, 2005).
9. Id. The names “Home Sweet Home” and “Low Divide” are derived from their
location in the Park.
10. Id. at 3.
11. Wilderness Act of 1964 § 4(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (2012). The Act’s history, purpose,
and function are explained in full in Part II.
12. Pub. L. No. 100-668, 102 Stat. 3961 (1988). Its relation to the Wilderness Act is
explained in full in Part II.
13. Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J., Olympic Park Assocs. at 16 v. Mainella, No. C04-5732FDB,
2005 WL 1871114 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 1, 2005) (No. 3:04-cv-05732).
14. Defs.’ Cross Mot. Summ. J. at *8–10, 12–14, Olympic Park Assocs v. Mainella,
No. C04-5732FDB, 2005 WL 1871114 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 1, 2005) (No. 3:04-cv-05732).
15. Peter A. Appel, Wilderness and the Courts, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 62, 82 (2010).
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analyzing how and why courts apply them in the cases that
follow.
In Part III, the Article introduces the plain meaning rule.
The Article discusses why the exception to the plain meaning
rule, which triggers a review of legislative history for clarity, is
often and appropriately invoked in competing-interest cases
implicating the Wilderness Act. The Article then establishes
and uses a competing interest case sample, Wilderness Watch,
Inc. v. Creachbaum,16 to explain how applying the exception to
the plain meaning rule to the Wilderness Act’s minimum
requirements exception—one of the key phrases discussed in
Part II—leads to the conclusion that courts owe a great deal of
deference to the NPS.
In Part IV, the Article traces the evolution of competing
interest cases specific to historic structures in wilderness
areas, highlighting shortcomings in how the Western District
of Washington (WDWA) has applied precedents. In Wilderness
Watch, Inc. v. Mainella,17 the Eleventh Circuit provided an
easily misinterpreted and misapplied opinion that, despite its
narrow holding, the WDWA has continually misread so as not
to afford the NPS due deference. In Olympic Park Associates v.
Mainella,18 the WDWA misread the Eleventh Circuit opinion
in Wilderness Watch to pit the NHPA against the Wilderness
Act, creating a general versus specific provision fallacy, as if
one statute must cancel out the other. Seven years after
Olympic Park Associates, the WDWA further diminished the
weight of deference given to the NPS by narrowing the
threshold of acceptable wilderness administration in
Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. Iwamoto.19 The Article discusses how
Olympic Park Associates and Iwamoto put the NPS in a
precarious position; affording the agency just enough
discretionary authority to attempt to administer the Olympic
Wilderness, but qualified by the understanding that that any
action protecting historic shelters from natural erosion would
place the NPS in the Wilderness Act’s crosshairs.
Finally, in Part V, the Article discusses how WDWA’s failure
to recognize the historical context and legislative history of the
16. No. C15-5771-RBL, 2016 WL 7231433 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 14, 2016).
17. 375 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2004).
18. No. CO4-5732FDB, 2005 WL 1871114 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 1, 2005).
19. 853 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1065 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
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Wilderness Act and the WPWA diminished the persuasiveness
of the Court’s analysis in Creachbaum. The Article also
sketches how a more complete interpretation of the wilderness
statutes applies to the fact pattern in Creachbaum.
By examining the history of the Wilderness Act and
affiliated area-specific statutes, this Article emphasizes that
wilderness area legislation has always recognized the value of
historic preservation in wilderness areas. Certain actions are
necessary to preserve historic structures, even when those
actions would otherwise be unlawful in a wilderness area. This
Article will demonstrate that historic preservation can be
reconciled not only with the plain language of the Wilderness
Act, but with the underlying philosophy of that Act, which
emphasizes protection from excessive human influence.
II.

THE WILDERNESS ACT

Understanding the tension at issue in Creachbaum requires
familiarity with the core language of the wilderness statutes.
The practical effect of what has been described as the more
poetic language of the Wilderness Act may not be obvious to
agencies, such as the NPS and the Forest Service, that are
charged with following its directives.20
The Wilderness Act provides for the establishment of a
National Wilderness Preservation System for the permanent
good of the whole people.21 The Act defines wilderness as “an
area where the earth and its community of life are
untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does
not remain.”22 The Act further provides that an area of
wilderness is “an area of undeveloped Federal land retaining
its primeval character and influence, without permanent
improvements or human habitation, which is protected and
managed so as to preserve its natural conditions.”23 Subsection
(4)(c) provides that “there shall be no temporary road, no use of

20. Douglas O. Linder, New Direction for Preservation Law: Creating an
Environment Worth Experiencing, 20 ENVTL. L. 49, 69 (1990); John G. Sprankling, The
Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 560 n.213
(1996); Kristine S. Cherek, From Trespasser to Homeowner: The Case Against Adverse
Possession in the Post-Crash World, 20 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 271, 284 (2012).
21. Wilderness Act of 1964 § 4(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (2012).
22. Id. at § 1132(c).
23. Id.
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motor vehicles, motorized equipment or motorboats, no landing
of aircraft, no other form of mechanical transport, and no
structure or installation within any such area,” except as
necessary “to meet minimum requirements for the
administration of the area for the purpose of [the] Act.”24
Subsection (4)(c), particularly the “minimum requirements for
the administration of the area” language, has become the hook
by which many a court has hung its hat in finding against the
NPS in use-based disputes.25
A.

The Washington Park Wilderness Act and its Relevance in
Creachbaum

Congress saw fit to protect much of Olympic National Park
when it enacted the Washington Park Wilderness Act of
1988.26 Designating 95 percent of the park as the “Olympic
Wilderness,” Congress recognized the value in maintaining a
public park “for the benefit and enjoyment of the people,”27 and
charged the NPS with “[t]he administration, protection, and
development of the [Park].”28 While the text of the WPWA
itself merely establishes the boundaries of the wilderness area,
an analysis of its legislative history in Part III will provide a
clearer understanding of congressional intent relative to park
visitors’ permitted uses.
At 1,370 square miles, the Olympic Wilderness is one of the
larger wilderness areas in the state.29 The Makah, Quillayute,
Hoh, and Quinalt tribes established reservations at the
mouths of the coastal rivers by the 1850’s.30 European settlers
fished, logged, and built homesteads, lookouts, and cabins
along the Olympic Peninsula in the late 19th century.31 While
24. Id. at § 1133(c) (2012).
25. E.g., Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service, 629 F.3d
1024, 1037 (9th Cir. 2010); Wilderness Watch and Public Employees for Envtl.
Responsibility v. Mainella, 375 F.3d 1085, 1092 (11th Cir. 2004); High Sierra Hiker’s
Ass’n v. United States Forest Service, 436 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1133 (E.D. Cal. 2006).
26. 16 U.S.C. § 251 (2012).
27. Id.
28. Id. at § 254.
29. History
&
Culture,
NAT’L
PARK
SERV.,
https://www.nps.gov/olym/learn/historyculture/index.htm (last visited May 14, 2017).
30. People
of
the
Olympic
Peninsula,
NAT’L
PARK
SERV.,
https://www.nps.gov/olym/learn/historyculture/people.htm (last visited May 14, 2017).
31. Id.
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many homesteaders moved elsewhere, the establishment of the
Olympic Forest Reserve in 1897 signaled greater interest in
protecting the area’s disappearing forests.32 The Forest Service
built many ranger stations, lookouts, cabins, and barns to
accommodate increased recreation in the area.33 When
Congress established Olympic National Park in 1938, it gave
the Secretary of the Interior the authority to administer,
protect, and develop the Park, and it gave President Roosevelt
the authority to expand park boundaries.34 President Roosevelt
exercised his authority by stripping 187,000 acres away from
the Forest Service and encouraging the development of more
structures on this new land, including some of the shelters and
cabins in dispute in Creachbaum.35 Exercising its discretionary
authority, the NPS maintained many of these structures up to
and after the enactment of the Wilderness Act and the
WPWA.36
Beginning in 2011, the NPS decided to rehabilitate and
repair Wilder Shelter, Bear Camp Shelter, Canyon Creek
Shelter, Elk Lake Shelter, and Pelton Creek Shelter in the
Olympic Wilderness. 37 Those doing the rehabilitating and
repairing sometimes used helicopters and motorized tools. 38
Wilderness Watch, an organization “whose sole focus is the
preservation and proper stewardship of lands and rivers
included in the National Wilderness Preservation System,”39
disputed the presence of these structures in the Olympic
Wilderness and the lengths to which the NPS went to preserve

32. Supra note 29.
33. Appendix B: Extant Buildings Grouped by Historic Themes, NAT’L PARK SERV.,
https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/olym/hrs/appb.htm (last visited Apr. 26,
2017).
34. 16 U.S.C. § 254 (2012).
35. The National Parks: America’s Best Idea, PUB. BROADCASTING SERV.,
http://www.pbs.org/nationalparks/history/ep5/4/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2017).
36. WASH. ST. DEP’T OF ARCHAEOLOGY & HIST. PRESERVATION, Preservation Groups
Unite to Support Historic Structures in Olympic National Park, WASH. ST. DEP’T OF
ARCHAEOLOGY
&
HIST.
PRESERVATION
(June
15,
2016),
http://www.dahp.wa.gov/blog/2016/06/preservation-groups-unite-to-support-historicstructures-in-olympic-national-park.
37. Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. Creachbaum, No. C15-5771-RBL, 2016 WL 7231433 at
*3 (W.D. Wash. 2016).
38. Id.
39. WILDERNESS
WATCH,
About
Us,
WILDERNESS
https://wildernesswatch.org/about-us (last visited Apr. 26, 2017).
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them. Filing a complaint in October 2015 in the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Washington (WDWA), the
organization challenged the decisions of Park Superintendent
Sarah Creachbaum and the NPS regarding the five shelters. 40
Wilderness Watch alleged violations of the Wilderness Act and
sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Taking issue with a
lack of communication, the organization noted that “[t]he Park
Service also authorized the work without notifying the public”
and failed to provide the public with “an opportunity to
comment on the proposed actions.”41
DOJ denied that the NPS authorized the work without
public notice and argued that the Wilderness Act justified the
NPS’ use of helicopters and motorized tools for administration
of the area.42 However, before looking to the Wilderness Act,
DOJ turned to the NHPA to note how important maintenance
of the structures are “as a matter of policy.”43 DOJ argued that
the NPS “ha[d] the authority to preserve these historic
structures in compliance with the NHPA and within the
requirements of the Wilderness Act.”44 Adopting the notion
that the NHPA is supplemental to the Wilderness Act—an
idea discussed later in this Article—DOJ noted that “NPS
interprets these statutes not as antagonists working against
one another . . . but as legislation to be reconciled in service of
NPS’ mission ‘to conserve the scenery and the natural and
historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the
enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as
we will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future
generations.’”45
A number of organizations interested in the preservation of
the structures intervened46 and filed a response to Wilderness

40. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief against Defendant, Wilderness
Watch, Inc. v. Creachbaum, No. 3:15-cv-05771-RBL (W.D. Wash. Oct. 27, 2015).
41. Id. at 2.
42. Federal Defendants’ Reply Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for
Summary Judgment at 4, Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. Creachbaum, No. 3:15-cv-05771RBL (W.D. Wash. Aug. 26, 2016).
43. Id. at 2.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2–3 (citing 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a) (2012)).
46. Intervening organizations included National Trust for Historic Preservation,
Washington Trust for Historic Preservation, and Friends of Olympic National Park.
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Watch’s motion for summary judgment.47 Wilderness Watch’s
and the intervenors’ arguments demonstrated “the breadth of
opposing views regarding the management” of the park held by
park visitors. 48 At opposite extremes, Wilderness Watch
argued that historic structures in wilderness areas were “an
eyesore to be demolished” and prohibited by the Wilderness
Act,49 while the intervenors argued that these same structures
were “a national treasure to be preserved” and that the NHPA
required such preservation.50 Rather than mine the Wilderness
Act for supportive language, the intervenors looked for an
NHPA workaround—something in the NHPA that might
excuse the NPS’s action. Inherent in the intervenors’ approach
to the legal problem was a concession that the NPS did
something that, absent an excuse, was a violation of the
Wilderness Act.51
B.

The National Historic Preservation Act

This Article’s premise—that those seeking the preservation
of historic structures in wilderness areas too often turn first to
the NHPA—is based on the idea that the Wilderness Act
provides the NPS sufficient support. However, a primer on the
NHPA may help explain the statute’s magnetism.
The NHPA provides for the preservation of sites, buildings,
and objects of national significance.52 The Act further provides:
[T]he head of any Federal agency having direct or
indirect jurisdiction over a proposed Federal or
federally assisted undertaking in any State and the
head of any Federal department or independent agency
having authority to license any undertaking, prior to
the approval of the expenditure of any Federal funds on
the undertaking . . . shall take into account the effect of

47. Intervenors’ Answer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, Wilderness Watch,
Inc. v. Creachbaum, No. 3:15-cv-05771-RBL (W.D. Wash. July 20, 2016).
48. Intervenors’ Reply Memorandum in Support of Their Motion Summary
Judgment at 2, Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. Creachbaum, No. 3:15-cv-05771-RBL (W.D.
Wash. Aug. 26, 2016), ECF No. 48.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. National Historic Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-665, 80 Stat. 915 (1966).
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the undertaking on any historic property.53
The Act defines an “undertaking” as “a project, activity, or
program . . . under the direct or indirect jurisdiction of a
Federal agency.”54 A regulation on the process of identifying
historic properties provides that the agency “shall make a
reasonable and good faith effort to carry out appropriate
identification efforts, which may include background research,
consultation,
oral
history
interviews,
sample
field
55
investigation, and field survey.” The regulation further
provides that “[s]ection 106 of the [NHPA] requires Federal
agencies to take into account the effects of their undertakings
on historic properties and afford the [Advisory Council on
Historic Preservation] a reasonable opportunity to comment on
such undertakings.”56
“[R]easonable and good faith effort” and “take into account”
are to the NHPA what “minimum requirements for the
administration of the area” is to the Wilderness Act. In other
words, these provisions are the meat of the statute, the
interpretation of which will likely determine whose interest
takes precedence, or whose competing interest will be
prohibited. As discussed in the following section, the plain
meaning of these and other provisions relevant to Creachbaum
are not so obvious and may require looking to legislative
history for clarity.
III. THE PLAIN MEANING RULE AS APPLIED TO
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS
The plain meaning rule provides that “where the language of
an enactment is clear and construction according to its terms
does not lead to absurd or impracticable consequences, the
words employed are to be taken as the final expression of the
meaning intended.”57 Courts invoke the exception to the plain
meaning rule when the same provision is susceptible to

53. 54 U.S.C.A. § 306108 (West 2017) (formerly cited as 16 U.S.C. § 470(f)).
54. 54 U.S.C.A. § 300320 (West 2017) (formerly cited as 16 U.S.C. § 470(w)).
55. 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(b)(1) (2016).
56. 36 C.F.R. § 800.1 (2016).
57. See United States v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929); see also
Arthur W. Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The “Plain-Meaning Rule” and Statutory
Interpretation in the “Modern” Federal Courts, 75 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1299 (1975).
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multiple reasonable interpretations.58 For example, one party
may argue that the language is unclear, but it may be made
clear were the court to examine congressional reports,
hearings, and debates. When such doubt as to the meaning of a
statute exists, the court may resort to legislative history for
clarity.59 However, where the language is clear, the words used
are taken as a final expression of the meaning intended.60
While Wilderness Watch and the Department of Justice
(DOJ) never explicitly reference the plain meaning rule in
Creachbaum, it is clear from the pleadings that the parties
disagree about the meaning of the same statutory provisions. 61
Section 1133(b) of the Wilderness Act states that “wilderness
areas shall be devoted to the public purposes of recreational,
scenic, scientific, educational, conservation, and historical
use.”62 The provision also states that “each agency shall so
administer [any area designated as wilderness] for such other
purposes for which it may have been established as also to
preserve its wilderness character.” Section 1133(c) prohibits
structures or installations and the use of motorized equipment
“except as necessary to meet minimum requirements for the
administration of the area.”63
In an effort to show that its planned use of motorized
equipment
falls
under
section
1133(c)’s
minimum
requirements exception, the NPS will complete a minimum
requirements analysis. For example, the NPS completed a
minimum requirements analysis for Botten Cabin, Wilder
Shelter, and Bear Camp Shelter in Olympic National Park in
58. Webb v. Smart Document Solutions, LLC, 499 F.3d 1078, 1085 (9th Cir. 2007);
Forte v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 780 F.3d 272, 278 (5th Cir. 2015).
59. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 278 U.S. at 278.
60. Id. (adding that “in such cases legislative history may not be used to support a
construction that adds to or takes from the significance of the words employed”).
61. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief against Defendant at 10,
Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. Creachbaum, No. 3:15-cv-05771-RBL (W.D. Wash. Oct. 27,
2015) (“[T]he Park Service repaired and rebuilt structures and used motorized vehicles
in the Olympic Wilderness in a manner and to an extent that was not ‘necessary to
meet minimum requirements for the administration of the area. . . .”); Defendants’
Reply Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment at 6,
Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. Creachbaum, No. 3:15-cv-05771-RBL (W.D. Wash. Aug. 26,
2016) (“Plaintiff incorrectly argues that NPS failed to determine whether each
individual structure was necessary to meet the minimum requirement for
administration of the area for the purpose of the Act”).
62. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b) (2012).
63. Id. at § 1133(c).
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2011.64 The minimum requirements analysis has been
described as a two-step process. First, the agency
demonstrates that the proposed action is essential to achieving
some Wilderness Act goal; show that it cannot be accomplished
by non-prohibited activities—prohibited activities being
activities such as the use of motor vehicles or motorized
equipment.65 Second, the agency must demonstrate that the
proposed action would minimize impact on wilderness values.66
Under the NPS’s two-step process outlined in its
management guidance, the agency first determines whether a
use is prohibited by the Wilderness Act. If the use is
prohibited, the NPS documents whether the prohibited use is
necessary to meet minimum requirements for the
administration of the area.67 The NPS then determines which
activity will accomplish the action with the least negative
impact to the wilderness. 68
In its complaint against Creachbaum and the NPS,
Wilderness Watch argued that the NPS “rebuilt structures,
and used motorized vehicles and tools to do so, in a manner
and to an extent that was not ‘necessary to meet minimum
requirements for the administration of the area for the purpose
of [the Wilderness Act].’”69 While noting that the NPS “often
utilizes ‘Minimum Requirements Decision Guides’ to
determine whether a prohibited use is ‘necessary to meet
minimum requirements for the administration of the area,’”
Wilderness Watch argued that the NPS failed to: (1) address
whether maintaining fewer than all of the structures in the
Park would meet minimum requirements; and (2) explain why
using helicopters and motorized vehicles to rehabilitate the
shelters was necessary to meet minimum requirements.70
In its answer, DOJ argued that the NPS “retains the
discretion and authority to preserve cultural resources within
64. Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. Creachbaum, No. C15-5771-RBL, 2016 WL 7231433 at
*3 (W.D. Wash. 2016).
65. Eric Biber and Elisabeth Long, The Wilderness Act and Climate Change
Adaptation, 44 ENVTL. L. 623, 673 (2014).
66. Id. at 673–74.
67. Id. at 674.
68. Id. at 675.
69. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief against Defendant, Wilderness
Watch, Inc. v. Creachbaum, No. 3:15-cv-05771-RBL (W.D. Wash. Oct. 27, 2015).
70. Id. at 8.
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wilderness, so long as the means used to do so are ‘necessary to
meet the minimum requirements for the administration’ of the
Olympic Wilderness.”71 DOJ pointed to Ninth Circuit
precedent in citing to Wilderness Watch v. Iwamoto—discussed
extensively later in this Article—for the proposition that
historical use is a valid purpose of the Wilderness Act.72 The
court in Iwamoto found that, because historical use is listed as
one of the six public purposes of the statute, historic
preservation could further the goals of the Wilderness Act. 73
DOJ argued that, to the extent that the Wilderness Act is
ambiguous as to whether “historical use” embraces the historic
preservation of structures, the “well-reasoned and longstanding interpretation” of the NPS is entitled to deference.74
DOJ also addressed Wilderness Watch’s argument that the
NPS failed to explain why maintaining the five shelters in
Olympic National Park was necessary to meet minimum
requirements for the administration of the area.75 In
interpreting the minimum requirements language, DOJ
framed the relevant question as “whether this maintenance
was necessary for the purpose of historical use of the Olympic
Wilderness.”76 According to DOJ, Park officials considered
whether the action to be taken for each structure was
necessary or appropriate to meet wilderness objectives or the
requirements of other laws, policies, and directives, and
explained why it found that the action was necessary. 77 Park
officials weighed whether damage to the historic structures
could be addressed through visitor education or actions outside
71. Defendants’ Reply Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summary
Judgment at 6, Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. Creachbaum, No. 3:15-cv-05771-RBL (W.D.
Wash. Aug. 26, 2016).
72. Id. (citing Wilderness Watch v. Iwamoto, 853 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1074 (W.D.
Wash. 2012)).
73. Iwamoto, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 1075 (noting that the “Court has deferred to the
Forest Service's conclusion that historical preservation furthers the goals of the
Wilderness Act”)
74. Id. (citing Vigil v. Leavitt, 381 F.3d 826, 835 (9th Cir. 2004); Iwamoto, 853 F.
Supp. 2d at 1072 (W.D. Wash. 2012)) (“Defendants’ interpretation of the Wilderness
Act must be given deference by this Court unless it is unambiguously contrary to the
language of the Act, in which case no deference is owed”).
75. Id. at 11.
76. Id.
77. Defendants’ Reply Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summary
Judgment at 13, Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. Creachbaum, No. 3:15-cv-05771-RBL (W.D.
Wash. Aug. 26, 2016)
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of wilderness, and found neither option would address
maintenance needs.78
DOJ highlighted the Wilderness Act’s ambiguity to counter
Wilderness Watch’s claim that the NPS’s necessity analysis
and determination was insufficient.79 DOJ argued that the
statute “is framed in general terms and does not specify any
particular form or content for such an assessment.”80 Citing
two Ninth Circuit cases for precedent, DOJ argued that since
the Wilderness Act did not specify particular content for
necessity analysis, the court should defer to the NPS’ format
for completing the necessity determination and minimum
requirements analysis.81
In arguing for the minimum requirement provision’s
ambiguity, DOJ cracked open the door for a convincing
argument based in the plain meaning rule, but stopped short
of delving deeper into legislative history. Instead, DOJ argued
that “historical use” is not ambiguous, but if the court were to
find the term ambiguous, “the legislative history of the
[WPWA] demonstrates that Congress did not intend the
passage of the Act to require the destruction or removal of
these historic structures.”82 Yet, DOJ never provided specific
examples from legislative history to prove that Congress
intended to preserve historic structures. DOJ merely argued
that “Congress intended that [NPS] would retain its discretion
to determine the best treatment for these historic resources in
wilderness.”83 While that is true, there is more to mine in the
legislative history of both wilderness acts, and the next section
will reveal why DOJ should have looked deeper for support.
A.

Finding Clarity in the Wilderness Act’s Legislative History
In its answer to Wilderness Watch’s complaint, DOJ

78. Id.
79. Id. at 6 (“To the extent the Wilderness Act may be construed to be ambiguous as
to whether these terms embrace the historic preservation of man-made structures, the
well-reasoned and long standing interpretation of these federal agencies is entitled to
deference”) (citing Vigil v. Leavitt, 381 F.3d 826, 835 (9th Cir. 2004)).
80. Id. at 12–13 (citing High Sierra Hiker’s Ass’n v. Blackwell, 390 F.3d 630, 646–47
(9th Cir. 2004)).
81. Id. at 13 (citing Blackwell, 390 F.3d at 646–47 and Wilderness Watch, Inc. v.
United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 629 F.3d 1024, 1036 (9th Cir. 2010)).
82. Id. at 9.
83. Id.
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referenced but failed to define the Wilderness Act’s directive to
the NPS to ensure the preservation of wilderness areas’
“wilderness character.”84 The failure to define wilderness
character is understandable given that the Act itself appears
to recognize differing definitions of wilderness—one
aspirational85 and the other pragmatic.86 The first sentence of
section 1131(c) defines “wilderness” as an area where “the
earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man,
where man himself is a visitor who does not remain.”87 It
states the ideal. However, section 1131(c) also provides that a
wilderness area is an area to be protected and managed so
man’s works are “substantially unnoticeable.”88 Perhaps
clearer in theory, the line between “untrammeled by man” and
“substantially unnoticeable” becomes more difficult to draw in
practice.
While Congress and government officials rarely spoke
directly to how the Wilderness Act should treat existing
structures and future development of structures within
designated wilderness areas, they did hear public support for
the preservation of such structures. Maurice Leon, Jr.—an
avid outdoorsman based in Story, Wyoming—spoke before the
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs months before the
bill’s enactment, arguing that “shelter huts” were consistent
with wilderness character and preservation.89 Leon advocated
for greater agency deference; “wilderness preservation is an art
as well as a science and managed by those who know and
respect it[,] it can be used by far larger numbers than use it

84. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (2012).
85. Kevin Hayes, History and Future of the Conflict Over Wilderness Designations of
BLM Land in Utah, 16 J. ENVTL. & LITIG. 203, 208 (2001) (“Although highly
aspirational and a powerful tool in the preservation of our country’s natural resources,
the full potential of the Wilderness Act remains unrealized”).
86. Matthew J. Ochs, Defining Wilderness: From McCloskey to Legislative,
Administrative and Judicial Paradigms, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 659, 679 (1999) (“Basing
decisions on idealized notions or pragmatic considerations, those who are charged with
applying the definition Congress incorporated in the Wilderness Act seem incapable of
achieving a common interpretation”).
87. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c).
88. Id.
89. S.4 A Bill to Establish a Nat’l Wilderness Preservation System for the Permanent
Good of the Whole People, and for Other Purposes: Hearings Before the S. Subcomm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 88th Cong. 262 (1963) (statement of Maurice Leon, Jr.).
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now, in perfect safety from defilement.”90
Speaking well before much of Olympic National Park was
designated a wilderness area, Jack Dolstad (the official
spokesman for the Olympic Park Association) stated, “[o]n the
wilderness ocean strip, where the [student conservation
program] has built trails over the headlands and constructed
rustic shelters for visitor use, I am amazed at the number of
people using these facilities both summer and winter.”91
Noting that he had “recently seen backpackers traveling over
trails that had not been used since pre-park times,” Dolstad
suggested that the presence of shelters served the same
interests the bill was intended to serve, so long as wilderness
itself remained protected: “[w]e have in Washington State a
future recreational gold mine, if we refrain from denuding the
last few remaining wild areas.”92
As revealing as the Wilderness Act’s legislative history may
be, congressional hearings leading up to the enactment of the
WPWA specifically highlight Congress’s intent with respect to
historic structures in Olympic National Park. President
Reagan signed the statute into law on November 16, 1988. 93
Over 849,000 acres of land and nineteen separate areas within
Olympic National Park, Mount Rainier National Park, and
North Cascades NP Service Complex fell under the protection
of the Act as components of the National Wilderness
Preservation System.94 Congress acknowledged that it
designated certain lands in Olympic National Park as
wilderness “[i]n furtherance of the purposes of the Wilderness
Act,”95 and stated “[s]uch lands shall be known as the Olympic
Wilderness.”96 Although the Act does not mention structures of
90. Id.
91. Bills to Establish a Nat’l Wilderness Preservation System for the Permanent Good
of the Whole People, and for Other Purposes: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Public Lands of the Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 88th Cong. 166 (1964)
(statement of Jack Dolstad).
92. Id.
93. James Tricker, et al., Mapping Wilderness Character in Olympic National Park:
Final Report, OLYMPIC WILDERNESS IN OLYMPIC NATIONAL PARK (2013),
http://www.wilderness.net/toolboxes/documents/WC/Olympic%20NP%20WCM%20repo
rt.pdf.
94. The Washington Park Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 100-668, 102 Stat. 3961
(1988).
95. Id. § 101(a).
96. Id. § 101(a)(2).
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historic value in regard to the Park, legislative history reveals
that Congress intended for historic structures to have a place
in the Park.
Six Olympic National Park rangers advocated for a change
in the language of the WPWA “so that in the years ahead the
[Park Service] [would] be less likely to again start removing
rustic shelters.”97 Explaining that officials at the Park had
started “tearing down or burning down perfectly good rustic
cedar shake shelters . . . in the back country,” the rangers
noted that “those shelters blended in very well with the back
country environment, and [were] welcomed by all but the most
dedicated wilderness purists.”98 The rangers also noted that
“[the officials] stopped removing shelters only when people
from all over the Pacific Northwest rose up with loud voices of
protest, organized a group called Friends of Olympic Shelters,
and demanded that park officials stop destroying back country
shelters.”99 Prophetic of the tension at issue in Creachbaum
and cases discussed in subsequent sections of this Article, the
rangers distinguished between the purist backpacker and
everyone else in reaffirming the need for the preservation of
shelters within the Park: “[the backpacker] wants no sign
whatever of man or his works while he is hiking . . . [b]ut this
purist represents probably no more than one-fourth of the
80,000 people hiking Olympic back country trails each year.”100
Echoing the rangers’ desire to preserve existing structures,
Washington Senator Daniel J. Evans said that “[i]t would be
my presumption that designation of the park as wilderness by
[the] act should not, in and of itself, be utilized as justification
for removal of any of these structures from the park.”101 While
acknowledging that some of the structures would need to be
removed to protect wildlife in the Park, he said that “[f]or
others, repairs and stabilization may be warranted to ensure

97. H.R. 4146 Washington Park Wilderness Bill of 1988: Hearings Before the H .
Subcomm. on Nat’l Parks and Public Lands of the Comm. on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 100th Cong. 784 (1988) (statement by six concerned Olympic National Park
Rangers) [hereinafter Park Rangers’ Statement].
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 134 CONG . REC. 31,340, 31,342 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Daniel J. Evans) [hereinafter Sen. Daniel Evans’ Statement].
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the preservation of their historic integrity.”102 Senator Evans
noted that the NPS had “plans to evaluate each structure on
its own merits,” and he hoped that through those plans
decisions would be made “with regard to future use,
maintenance, relocation, stabilization, or removal as
appropriate for each shelter.”103 Recognizing that historic
preservation could be complimentary to the directives of the
Wilderness Act, the NPS would evaluate each shelter
individually to determine the appropriateness of repair and
stabilization.
Senator Evans hinted at a necessary balance between the
interest of park visitors and conservation, stating that on one
hand “[t]he development necessary to accommodate park
visitor[s] will be confined to the areas already developed,
preventing further encroachment into the wilderness area of
the parks.”104 On the other hand, he reaffirmed that the bill
would not “shut the park visitor out of the park” but “ensure
that all future generations of park enthusiasts will be able to
enjoy the same wilderness parks that we enjoy now.”105
Senator Evans recognized that “[t]he parks are there to
provide for recreation as well as the preservation of a natural
ecosystem.”106
Washington Senator Brock Adams spoke of a similar
balance of interests. Senator Adams said that “[w]hile people
may continue to visit the wilderness areas, and thereby
appreciate nature in its most pristine state, they will be
prohibited from altering that condition.”107 While cautioning
that “[o]nce designated as wilderness, the common signs of
human activity—roads, buildings, and recreational facilities—
[would] be prohibited,” Senator Adams reassured those present
at the hearing that the bill would not “cut off access to parks”
because “[the] legislation makes exception for those areas

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 31,341.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. S. 2165 To Designate Wilderness Within Olympic Nat’l Park, Mount Rainier
Nat’l Park, and North Cascades Nat’l Park Complex in the State of WA, and for Other
Purposes: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Public Lands, Nat’l Parks and Forests of
the Comm. on Energy and Nat. Res., 100th Cong. 27 (1988) (statement of Sen. Brock
Adams) [hereinafter Sen. Brock Adams’ Statement].
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where human influence is already present.”108 Those areas
would “retain their current status and use under Park Service
direction.”109 In other words, prohibition of the common signs
of human activity applied only to those areas where human
influence was not already present. Senator Adams’ words seem
to suggest that Congress intended for the NPS to retain
discretionary authority in determining whether structures in
wilderness areas would be retained or rehabilitated.
Despite the clear intention that the NPS retain authority to
make individual determinations on the status of each shelter,
courts—particularly the WDWA—have rarely afforded the
agency such discretionary authority, and it is hard to explicitly
find it in the statute. Insofar as its influence on the NPS in
Olympic National Park, an Eleventh Circuit case concerning a
wilderness area in Cumberland Island, Georgia is at least
partly to blame for this failure to recognize the flexibility
inherent in the relevant statutes.110 The problems presented by
that CA11 case, Wilderness Watch v. Mainella, have been
exacerbated by the WDWA’s reliance on its holdings. As the
sections that follow demonstrate, however, an accurate reading
of Mainella establishes that its holding was, in fact, quite
narrow. Several WDWA decisions misread Mainella, and
appropriate application of its holding to Creachbaum and other
cases would grant the kind of flexibility in Wilderness Area
management that has thus far been absent from judicial
decisions in this space.
IV. WILDERNESS WATCH V. MAINELLA: THE NHPA AS
SUPPLEMENTAL TO THE WILDERNESS ACT
In Mainella, a debate over competing interests regarding the
designated wilderness area in Cumberland Island, Georgia
gave rise to a decision that courts and litigants alike cite for
the proposition that the NHPA defers to the Wilderness Act
when the two are in conflict. 111 However, a closer reading of
the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Mainella reveals that the
NHPA only supplements the Wilderness Act, and the two

108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. Mainella, 375 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2004).
111. Id.
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statutes are not in irrevocable conflict.
Wilderness Watch, a national advocacy organization, sought
to enjoin the NPS’s practice of using a fifteen-passenger van to
transport visitors across a designated wilderness area on
Cumberland Island, which encompassed two historical sites.
Congress designated most of the island as wilderness in
1982,112 ten years after declaring the island a National
Seashore.113 Visitors left their vehicles on the mainland and
traveled by boat to reach the island.114
The island contained two historic structures—one just
outside the wilderness boundary (Plum Orchard) and the other
in a wilderness area (the Settlement).115 Wilderness Watch
disputed the NPS’s use of the van to transport park visitors to
the historic sites because reaching both areas required the use
of a one-lane dirt road that traversed the wilderness area. 116
The NPS initially drove vehicles that held four passengers, but
began using a higher-capacity van to accommodate larger
numbers of visitors.117 The NPS claimed that park visitors
“piggybacking” along on its personnel trips yielded no net
increase in impact on the wilderness character of the area. 118
The agency argued that the need to preserve historical
structures furthered the goals of the Wilderness Act, and that
its obligation to curate historic resources necessitated
motorized access to the sites. 119 Since the NPS argued that it
had a separate duty to preserve the historical structures, the
preservation of historic structures in wilderness areas was
administration to further the purposes of the Act.120
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, finding instead that agency
obligations in the Wilderness Act and the NHPA were quite
different.121 While the NHPA requires agencies to assume
112. Cumberland Island Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 97-250, 96 Stat. 709 (1982).
113. 16 U.S.C. § 459(i) (2012).
114. Mainella, 375 F.3d at 1088.
115. Id.
116. Brief for Appellants, Wilderness Watch v. Mainella at 25–26, 375 F.3d 1085
(11th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-15346-HH).
117. Mainella, 375 F.3d at 1090.
118. Brief of Federal Defendants-Appellees, Wilderness Watch v. Mainella, 375 F.3d
1085 (11th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-15346-HH).
119. Mainella, 375 F.3d at 1089.
120. Id. at 1090.
121. Id. at 1091.
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responsibility for the preservation of historic properties they
control, “any obligation the agency has under the NHPA to
preserve these historical structures must be carried out so as
to preserve the ‘wilderness character’ of the area.”122 The court
found for Wilderness Watch, determining that driving a
fifteen-passenger van through the wilderness area failed to
preserve the area’s wilderness character.123
In limiting its decision to the facts of the case—that the NPS
provided motorized public access across designated wilderness
areas in violation of the Wilderness Act—the court did not
identify an inherent conflict between the NHPA and the
Wilderness Act. “Congress may separately provide for the
preservation of an existing historical structure within a
wilderness area, as it has done through the NHPA.”124 The
Eleventh Circuit decision recognized that the Wilderness Act
and the NHPA can co-exist when rehabilitative work on
historic structures survives minimum requirements analysis.
In Mainella, the agency’s decision was impermissible not
because the Wilderness Act took precedence over the NHPA,
but because the court determined that driving such a large van
so frequently through designated wilderness was not necessary
to meet minimum requirements for the administration of the
area.125 The following section will reveal not only how the
WDWA failed to make this distinction, but also how the court
created bad precedent for similar cases going forward.
A.

Olympic Park Associates v. Mainella: The General vs.
Specific Provision Fallacy

In a 1974 environmental impact statement (EIS), the NPS
called for the removal of a majority of shelters within Olympic
National Park. However, the agency also concluded that a
number of shelters would be retained for health and safety
purposes, including the two shelters at issue in the 2005 case
of Olympic Park Associates v. Mainella.126 The agency
determined in the same 1974 EIS that historic properties were
122. Id. at 1092.
123. Id. at 1096.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1092.
126. Olympic Park Assocs. v. Mainella, No. 3:04-cv-5732-FDB, slip op. at 5 (W.D.
Wash. Aug. 1, 2005).
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unaffected by wilderness designation.127 Despite the fact that
the shelters collapsed under snow loads, the NPS later deemed
the two structures eligible for the National Historic Register
because they contributed to a historic pattern of shelter
construction and recreational use.128
In 2001, park officials proposed a plan to the State for
rebuilding the collapsed shelters. 129 Following notice and
comment, the NPS determined that transporting the shelters
by helicopter to their historic locations would pose no
significant environmental impact. The agency found such
action would preserve important historical aspects of the
Park’s heritage and limit the amount of time spent
reconstructing structures in wilderness. 130 Nonetheless,
Olympic Park Associates alleged that NPS’s replacement of the
two collapsed shelters with new structures built off-site, as
well as its decision to fly in a helicopter to accomplish the job,
both violated the Wilderness Act.
Favoring Olympic Park Associates, the court stated that
while NHPA’s goals included rehabilitation, restoration,
stabilization, and maintenance, they did not include
reconstruction: “[w]here the former shelters at issue here have
been destroyed by natural forces, NHPA does not require
reconstruction.”131 Pointing to the Wilderness Act and its
mandate on “preserving the wilderness character” of an area
as a “specific provision,” and the NHPA as being “general,” the
court restated the rule of statutory construction—specific
provisions as being superior to general provisions where the
specific provisions govern an issue—to find that the NPS could
administer the Olympic Wilderness for other purposes only
insofar as to also preserve its wilderness character.132
The WDWA did devote some discussion to the wilderness
character of the Olympic Wilderness, but the court’s analysis
was limited.133 For example, the court noted that shelter

127. Id. at 2.
128. Id. at 3.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 3.
131. Id. at 10.
132. Olympic Park Assocs. v. Mainella, No. 3:04-cv-5732-FDB, slip op. at 11–12
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 1, 2005).
133. Id. at 13.
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construction and recreational use were “in the past,” and that
if the NPS had wanted to preserve history the agency could
have taken photographs of the shelters as the structures once
stood.134 In response to the NPS’s argument that the shelters
were significant aspects of historic use within the Park, the
court merely quoted the “untrammeled by man” statutory
language.135
The WDWA referenced Mainella’s distinction between
natural and man-made features in wilderness areas. 136
However, that discussion played a negligible role in the
Eleventh Circuit’s holding because the Eleventh Circuit never
questioned the validity of the pre-existing, man-made
structures in the Cumberland Island wilderness area. Rather,
the Eleventh Circuit questioned the permissibility under the
Wilderness Act of the great lengths the NPS went to provide
park visitors opportunities to see the Settlement.137
In Olympic Park Associates, the WDWA embraced only part
of the Eleventh Circuit’s approach to fact-specific analysis. A
more complete view of the approach was consistent with the
legislative history of the statutes giving rise to the wilderness
area at issue in the Cumberland Island case. Debate over the
Cumberland Island Wilderness Act, for instance, recognized
the tension between historic structures and wilderness free
from human presence. In speaking to historic structures
included in Cumberland Island’s wilderness area, Russell E.
Dickinson, Park Service Director, stated that because “[t]hese
are manmade features [,] [t]hey would be, by ordinary
circumstances, considered an intrusion in the wilderness.” 138
When President Reagan signed the Cumberland Island
Wilderness Act into law, he stated that because some proposed
wilderness areas contained structures of historic significance,
neither of those areas would have been wilderness within the

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 9.
137. Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. Mainella, 375 F.3d 1085, 1095 (11th Cir. 2004).
(“Obtaining a large van to accommodate fifteen tourists hardly appears to be a ‘routine
and continuing’ form of administration and maintenance”).
138. S. 2569 A Bill to Declare Certain Lands in the Cumberland Island Nat’l
Seashore, Georgia, as Wilderness, and for Other Purposes: Hearing Before the S.
Subcomm. on Public Lands and Reserved Water, Comm. on Energy and Nat’l Res.,
97th Cong. 22–23 (1982) (statement of Russell E. Dickenson).
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meaning of the Wilderness Act of 1964.139 In spite of whatever
effect the Wilderness Act would have had on such structures
absent the Cumberland Island Wilderness Act, the Eleventh
Circuit read the latter statute to permit the presence of the
Settlement within the island’s wilderness area. The WDWA
overlooked this observation in its analysis and failed to draw a
parallel between the structures on Cumberland Island and the
historic shelters within the Olympic Wilderness. Congress
recognized that while maintaining these structures within the
wilderness areas might be viewed as contrary to the platonic
ideal of a “wilderness area,” their presence was consistent with
the creation and maintenance of those particular wilderness
areas.
Rather than engage in a discussion concerning general
versus specific provisions, the WDWA should have limited its
analysis (like the Eleventh Circuit in Mainella) to the NPS’s
particular actions in relation to the historic structures, and in
light of the initial creation of the Olympic Wilderness Area.
When the court provided a fact-specific analysis,
distinguishing between rehabilitation and reconstruction of
historic structures, its observations read as logical and in
keeping with Mainella’s minimum requirements analysis.
Olympic Park Associates shows how district courts can easily
misinterpret the relationship between the Wilderness Act and
the NHPA to arrive at the conclusion that one statute must
cancel out the other (i.e. the “general” versus “specific
provision” discussion). Even when these courts focus on the
wilderness-specific statutes, however, they can easily read
them too narrowly, and thereby fail to reflect Congress’s intent
with respect to designating the wilderness area in Olympic
National Park. The following case exemplifies such a narrow
application, with the WDWA restraining the NPS’s ability to
exercise the discretionary authority Congress intended for the
agency.
B.

Wilderness Watch v. Iwamoto: A Narrow Threshold for
“Administration”
Built in the 1930s, the Green Mountain lookout (located in

139. Presidential Statement on Signing S. 1119 into Law, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES .
DOC. 1107 (Sept. 9, 1982) (statement of President Ronald Reagan).
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what would become the Glacier Peak Wilderness in the North
Cascades of Washington State) went through a few
rehabilitation efforts that included reconstructing its roof and
reinstalling its windows, shutters, and door. 140 Originally used
for fire protection, the lookout became a popular hiking
destination by the time Wilderness Watch filed suit against
the Forest Service in 2010.141 The Forest Service maintained
the lookout prior to its listing on the National Historic
Register, but condemned the structure from public access in
1994, pending repair on an as-funded basis.142
After soliciting advice and input from interested individuals
and groups, the Forest Service considered: “(1) dissembling the
lookout and removing it from the wilderness . . . ; (2) relocating
it to an area outside of wilderness; (3) burning it down; (4)
leaving it alone to naturally deteriorate; and (5) stabilizing and
repairing it, either with or without motorized equipment.”143
In 1998, the Forest Service decided to repair the lookout
using a rock drill and a helicopter to transport supplies, and
issued a decision memo detailing as much.144 However,
extreme weather damaged the lookout’s foundation, so the
Forest Service disassembled and removed the lookout piece-bypiece by helicopter.145 In 2009, seven years after the Forest
Service removed the lookout, the agency hired the NPS to
construct a new foundation for the structure.146 The NPS flew
the disassembled pieces to the mountain and reassembled on
site, which required at least sixty-seven helicopter trips in the
wilderness.147 Wilderness Watch filed suit, and the court
granted the group’s motion for summary judgment and
injunctive relief. 148
The Forest Service failed to persuade the WDWA that its
actions to preserve the lookout were justified in light of the
Wilderness Act’s devotion to “historical use” of wilderness

140. Wilderness Watch v. Iwamoto, 853 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1065 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1066.
143. Id. at 1067.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1063.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1079.

Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2017

25

Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 3

60

WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y

[Vol. 7:1

areas and the agency’s responsibilities pursuant to the NHPA
to preserve historic property.149 Wilderness Watch argued that
the NHPA was merely procedural, requiring agencies to take
properties into consideration when undertaking actions that
may affect properties eligible for or included in the Historical
Register.150 In contrast, the Forest Service argued that the
NHPA authorized affirmative action in furtherance of
historical preservation.151 The WDWA rejected the notion that
the agency had any affirmative obligation to preserve the
lookout pursuant to the NHPA.152 Instead, the court found that
there was no conflict between the Wilderness Act and the
NHPA because neither action nor inaction toward the lookout
would have placed the Forest Service in violation of the NHPA,
since the NHPA itself did not compel a particular outcome.153
In this respect, the WDWA corrected course after finding a
conflict between the two statutes in Olympic Park Associates.
Instead, the court found potential conflict between two
Wilderness Act provisions. The court recognized that the
reference to “historical use” in the Wilderness Act’s Section
4(b) created a potential conflict with an agency’s obligation to
preserve the “wilderness character” of a wilderness area.154
However, the court determined that “historical use” created an
ambiguity requiring deference to the Forest Service’s
interpretation that historical use was a valid goal of the Act.155
Even so, the court needed to determine whether the Forest
Service’s actions were necessary to meet the minimum
requirements for administration of the area for the purpose of
historical use. 156 The principal issue, as the WDWA saw it, was
149. Id. at 1070–71.
150. Id. at 1070 (“Thus, according to Plaintiff, there is no basis for the claim that the
Forest Service’s duties under the NHPA justified its actions with respect to the Green
Mountain lookout”).
151. Id. at 1070. (“[I]n the Service’s view, certain sections of the Act grant the
Service more than mere procedural responsibility with respect to preservation of
historic properties”).
152. Id. at 1071.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1074 (“[T]o the extent that the reference to ‘conservation’ in the list set
out in Section 4(b) creates an instruction that conflicts with an agency’s obligation to
preserve the area’s ‘wilderness character,’ the reference to ‘historical use’ in that same
list would logically create the same conflict”).
155. Id.
156. Id.
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whether the decision to rehabilitate and reconstruct the
lookout and use mechanized transport to do so was necessary
for the minimum administration of the area for historical
use.157
This is where the WDWA showed too little deference to the
agency’s discretionary authority yet also provided little to no
guidance on where to draw the line between permissible and
impermissible rehabilitative efforts in wilderness areas. The
court stated that “the nature of the Forest Service’s initial
decision to allow the lookout to remain in the wilderness area
and to be periodically maintained . . . is entirely different than
the nature of the . . . decision to fully disassemble the lookout,
transport the pieces off-site by helicopter . . . [and] fly new and
restored lookout pieces back in to the site.”158 Continuing, the
WDWA stated: “[i]t is clear that the Forest Service went to
extraordinary lengths to protect a man-made structure from
the natural erosive effects of time and weather. The Forest
Service went too far.”159
In making its minimum requirements determination, the
WDWA failed to recognize that there is no standard wilderness
character—it varies depending upon the nature of the
wilderness at issue. The court found that “less extreme
measures . . . could have been adopted, such as relocation of
the lookout outside the wilderness area, which would have had
less impact on the ‘wilderness character’ of the area but still
furthered the goal of historical preservation.”160 If the court
had looked to the legislative history of the WPWA to define the
otherwise ambiguous wilderness character of the Olympic
Wilderness, it would have discovered that a historic shelter
such as Green Mountain lookout is part and parcel of the
wilderness area. As Washington State Senator Adams noted in
a hearing shortly before the bill was enacted, the NPS was
tasked with the administration of those areas where human
influence was already present.161 The agency “evaluate[d] each
157. Id. at 1075 (“The essential question at this point is whether the 2002 decision to
engage in extensive rehabilitation and reconstruction of the lookout and the related
use of mechanized transport was ‘necessary’ for the ‘minimum administration’ of the
area for historical use”).
158. Id. at 1076.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Sen. Brock Adams’ Statement, supra note 107.
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structure on its own merits,” and exercised its discretionary
authority in determining the most feasible option for the
lookout’s repair. 162
The determinative question in any similar case may be,
“How far is too far?” The WDWA’s decisions in Olympic Park
Associates and Iwamoto put the NPS in a precarious situation,
affording the agency its discretionary authority to administer
the Olympic Wilderness, but qualifying that authority with an
understanding that any action protecting man-made
structures from natural erosion puts the agency in the
crosshairs of the Wilderness Act.
V.

LESSONS LEARNED: RETURNING TO CREACHBAUM

In its answer to Wilderness Watch’s amended complaint in
Creachbaum, DOJ noted that the NPS interprets the
Wilderness Act and the NHPA “not as antagonists working
against one another . . . but as legislation to be reconciled in
service of the NPS’s mission ‘to conserve the scenery and the
natural and historic objects and the wild life therein.’”163 The
WDWA, acknowledging that “historical use is a valid goal of
the [Wilderness] Act,” appeared to recognize the need for this
reconciliation in Iwamoto.164 While this recognition
represented a significant progression from Olympic Park
Associates insofar as to the court discussed minimum
requirements analysis, the court stopped short of affording the
NPS the discretionary authority the Wilderness Act provides
the agency.165
Iwamoto’s narrow interpretation of what constitutes the
minimum and necessary requirements for the administration
of a given wilderness area must be highlights the problematic
ambiguity of and inherent tension in the Wilderness Act’s
language. For example, the WDWA determined that since the
Forest Service relocated lookouts in another national forest to
a location outside the wilderness area, the Forest Service and
the NPS had alternatives to using the rock drill and helicopter

162. Sen. Daniel Evans’ Statement, supra note 101.
163. Defs.’ Reply Mem. in Supp. of Their Mot. Summ. J. at 1, Wilderness Watch v.
Creachbaum et al, No. 3:15-cv-05771-RBL (W.D. Wash. Aug. 26, 2016).
164. Iwamoto, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 1074.
165. Id. at 1075.
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in Iwamoto that would be consistent with furthering the
purposes of “historic use” of the lookout.166 The narrowness of
the WDWA’s determination serves to ignore important context,
such as that the location of the Green Mountain lookout
provided much of the structure’s historical importance, or that,
in enacting the Wilderness Act, Congress intended for the NPS
to evaluate each shelter individually.167
Were the WDWA to apply the same minimum requirements
standard it applied in Iwamoto to the facts in Creachbaum, the
court would have found that alternatives to using the
helicopter for shelter transport existed and thus the NPS’
actions violated the Wilderness Act. After reading Olympic
Park Associates and Iwamoto, it is difficult to imagine a
scenario where the court would find that no alternatives to
rehabilitation existed.
In failing to look to the WPWA’s legislative history, the
WDWA not only did itself a disservice by setting poor
precedent, but also left the NPS with a discretionary authority
the agency may be afraid to exercise in the future for lack of
knowing its real value. Legislative history reveals Congress’s
desire for NPS to apply its expertise to minimum requirements
determinations. Even if the WDWA were only to “pay ‘respect’
to the agency’s determination on this issue,”168 the court must
acknowledge that Congress intended for the NPS to determine
which rehabilitative efforts are most appropriate for each
individual shelter.
NPS maintenance of Wilder Shelter, Bear Camp Shelter,
Canyon Creek Shelter, Elk Lake Shelter, and Pelton Creek
Shelter was not the “further encroachment into the wilderness
area of the parks” Senator Evans spoke of the WPWA
prohibiting in 1988.169 Washington State senators drafting the
bill, Olympic National Park rangers, and the general public
made clear their intent that the WPWA ensure historic
structures such as those in Creachbaum had a place in the
Park after the statute’s enactment. If purist backpackers still
represent no more than one-fourth of the people hiking

166. Id.
167. Sen. Daniel Evans’ Statement, supra note 101.
168. Iwamoto, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 1075.
169. Sen. Daniel Evans’ Statement, supra note 101.
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Olympic back country trails each year,170 the NPS maintaining
these shelters after conducting minimum requirements
analysis is in keeping with the Wilderness Act’s directive that
the National Wilderness Preservation System exists “for the
permanent good of the whole people.”171

170. Park Rangers’ Statement, supra note 97.
171. 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (2012).
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